Cooperation and competition in a social structure: An agent- based model of fishing system
Abstract
Fishers strategize on a day-to-day basis in pursuit of their livelihood. There are many factors they consider in fishing but their ultimate goal is to choose a
good fishing site. Fishers, in the hope of locating good sites, try to access information from the high gainer fishers. Fishers may cooperate (share reliable information) or defect and a corresponding payoff results for their action. We analyze how cooperation/competition evolves as we vary the net income threshold of fishers to search for a new fishing site ρs and the net income threshold of fishers to punish defectors ρp. The final state of the system at low income threshold for the case ρs equals ρp is a global cooperation of fishers in contrast to the global competition (defect) for the case of high income threshold. We found a transition region where polarity (segregation) of cooperators and defectors formed. On the other hand, low ρp always result to cooperation regardless of the value of ρs.